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ABSTRACT
The award fee is a unique incentive structure that
provides the Government a method of subjective, after the fact
evaluation of contractor performance and affords the
Government additional flexibility to reward a contractor for
above average performance. Additionally, the award fee is not
subject to the Disputes clause of a Government contract. Use
of award fee serves to enhance contractor performance in areas
of quality, production management, ingenuity, timeliness, and
cost effectiveness. Currently, the award fee is mostly
utilized under cost reimbursement contracts. In order to
obtain the full benefit of the award fee, its use in fixed
price contracts should be considered. An analysis from the
perspective of economic theory, motivational theory, and
contracting theory was conducted. In addition, perspectives
from Government and private sector contracting personnel were
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The award fee is a unique incentive structure that
provides the Government a method of subjective, after the fact
evaluation of contractor performance and affords the
Government additional flexibility to reward a contractor for
above average performance. Additionally, the award fee is not
subject to the Disputes clause of a Government contract. Use
of award fee serves to enhance contractor performance in areas
of quality, production management, ingenuity, timeliness, and
cost effectiveness. Currently, the award fee is mostly
utilized under cost reimbursement contracts. Limiting the use
of award fee provisions to cost reimbursement contracts
restricts the Government's ability to derive the full benefit
of an award fee incentive. In order to obtain the full
benefit of the award fee, its use in fixed price contracts
should be considered.
Determining how Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contracts could be
effectively utilized is an important step in advocating the
authorized and practical use of this method of contracting.
In addition, discussion of defense contractors' viewpoints and
issues regarding this type of contracting is important in
determining its acceptance by the companies that will
ultimately be awardcd chc ontract.
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B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the research are:
1. To determine how a new contract type, one that combines
the characteristics ot a fixed price contract with an
award fee, called Fixed-Price-Award-Fee (FPAF) contract,
could be utilized effectively in the Federal acquisition
process.
2. To determine how Government contracting officials and
defense contractors would react to its use and
investigate issues and viewpoints regarding the use of
this new type of contract.
3. To evaluate the economic and motivational theory of the
FPAF incentive to determine key features that justify
its use in various contracting situations.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on these objectives, the primary research question
is:
After application of economic, motivation, and contracting
theory, in what situation might a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee
(FPAF) contract be utilized to provide for an effective use
of the incentive in the Federal acquisition process?
Secondary research questions include:
1. How do defense contractors and Government officials view
the use of Fixed-Price-Award-Fee (FPAF) as an incentive
arrangement in conducting business?
2. How might a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract be structured
to provide for an effective use of award fee incentives
in the Federal acquisition process?
D. SCOPE
The scope of the thesis focuses on applying economic,
motivational, and contracting theory to the FPAF incentive
arrangement, as well as obtaining perceptions of Government
and private sector contracting practitioners, in order to
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determine what is the most advantageous use of FPAF, and how
its use should be implemented.
Primary research for practitioner viewpoints will be in
the form of personal and phone interviews with acquisition
personnel from private sector contractors and Government
procurement offices.
Economic incentive research was based on applied economic
theory obtained from research of current economic studies.
Contracting theory derived, from Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contract
studies, was applied to the fixed price environment. The FPAF
contract has only been utilized on a very limited basis.
E. METHODOLOGY
To answer the primary and secondary research questions,
three research techniques were employed. First, a
comprehensive search of available literature dealing with
incentive and award fee contracting, contractor motivation,
motivational theory, and economic theory was conducted.
Second, an economic model was utilized to evaluate the
economic value of the Fixed-Price-Award-Fee incentive. Third,
research data were collected in the form of personal
interviews and phone interviews with acquisition personnel
from the Government and private sector. A list of the people
interviewed appears in Appendix A of this thesis, and a list
of the general interview questions appears in Appendix B.
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F. LIMITATIONS
The major limitation to this study was the lack of
specific data on the topic. The FPAF contract type has been
used on only a limited basis.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
This study assumes that the reader commands a general
knowledge or basic familiarity with Federal contracting
language and the Federal acquisition process. It is further
assumed that the reader is aware of the relationship that
exists between industry and the Federal Government in
contracting methodology.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
The research is organized in the following manner:
Chapter I contains the introduction and research questions to
be analyzed. Chapter II contains relevant background
infornation on incentive contracting history and theory.
Chapter III contains economic theory and economic model
application for the Fixed-Price-Award-Fee incentive. Chapter
IV discusses contractor and Government motivational theory and
applies the theory to FPAF. Chapter V discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of an FPAF contract as determined
by discussion with acquisition personnel for the Government
and defense contractors. Chapter VI provides conclusions
derived from the research, and recommendations on the use of




Civilian contractors produce over 98% of the material
required and utilized by the United States Armed Forces.
Incentive pricing arrangements or incentive contracts are
utilized by procurement personnel in the Federal Government as
a catalyst to motivate the contractor to perform in a
prescribed manner. The objective of the incentives, as
primarily utilized by the Federal Government and the
Department of Defense, is to compel the contractor to keep the
total cost of the contract as low as possible while still
satisfying the minimum needs specified and required by the end
user and written in the contract.
Discussion of incentive pricing arrangements requires
investigation of contractor motivation. Different pricing
arrangements motivate contractors in different ways. The
general guidance provided in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) is as follows:
Incentive Contracts . . . are appropriate when a firm fixed
price contract is not appropriate and the required supplies
or services can be acquired at lower costs and, in certain
instances, with improved delivery or technical performance,
by relating the amount of profit or fee payable under the
contract to the contractor's performance. [Ref. l:p.
16.401 (a)]
It should be noted that a fixed price contract is not
designated as an "incentive contract" in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, however it creates a powerful
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incentive for the contractor to keep its cost lower in order
to earn greater profit on that individual contract.
To prevent confusion between a contracting practitioner's
definition of profit and an economist's definition it is
necessary to distinguish between the two. Incentive contracts
assume the contractor is motivated by short term monetary
profit on a single contract. Long term profit encompasses the
non-profit objectives that contribute to long term
profitability. The firm may be willing to sacrifice some
short-term monetary profits on one contract in the interest of
increasing long term profits. These factors may be termed
objectives other than profits, but economists like to define
long term profits very broadly so that sales, follow-on work,
product quality, etc. all can be included under long term
profit.
B. THEORY OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
The Department of Defense sometimes has difficulties
getting contractors to perform the necessary actions or tasks
called for in the contractual document. For example,
contractors for whatever reason, may fail to deliver the item
required on time or within costs. In this case, it may be in
the Government's best interest to attempt to motivate the
defense contractors with additional incentives to get them to
perform as required. In fact, incentive contracting was
believed to be the panacea - the stimulus - to motivate
contractors. (Ref. 4:p. 4]
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Incentive contracting is not unique to the Government.
Basically the same contract types exist in the commercial
world. However, because contracts between commercial firms do
not usually involve excessive risk, the use of cost type
contracts is limited. Fixed price contracts are typically
used when the level of risk is low. Incentive contracting is
more widely used by the Government because of risk factors
involved with the type of products the Government procures.
In the absence of market forces, the price is determined
through negotiations between the buyers and sellers.
Therefore, in order to determine incentive arrangements that
will be efficient and effective it is important to review both
contractor and Government objectives.
Contractor objectives can be divided into contractual
objectives and long term corporate goals. These two
categories are related in that the collective objectives of
performing all Government contracts must reflect the overall
long term strategy. Previous research has determined that
corporations and firms have other objectives besides short
term profit. [Ref. 5:p. iii] Any one contractor could have
a number of different objectives.
The short term profit objective is not as strong as one
might think. Most managers strive for satisfactory short term
rather than maximum short term profit. Short term profit
maximization in many cases is dangerous in that it might
encourage the contractor to take every possible cost-saving
7
shortcut not expressly prohibited in the contract. [Ref. 6:p.
14] This incentive might be particularly strong on an
individual contract. However, continuation of cost saving
short cuts might detract from long term profit maximization.
Other objectives are important for long term profits including
company growth, providing a good product, market share,
developing new skills, guaranteeing follow on work,
controlling one's own destiny, safeguarding proprietary
interests, responding to the customer, utilizing excess
capacity, and improving cash flow. All of these items have
been cited as prime business objectives. [Ref. 5)
Once contractor objectives have been identified, the
performance of the contractor can be guided and improved if
the Government "helps" the contractor achieve these
objectives. [Ref. 6:p. 16]
The Government, like the contractor, has many varied
objectives on any given contract. Two classificatioas of
Government objectives exist: contractual objectives and extra
contractual objectives. The three primary Government
contractual objectives include:
1. Obtaining the exact item or service called for in the
specifications of the contract.
2. Obtaining it at a fair and reasonable price.
3. Ensuring on-time delivery.
Extra-contractual objectives are those that result from the
implementation of socio-economic objectives through the
contracting process. These include small and disadvantaged
8
business provisions, labor surplus set asides, employment of
the handicapped, and preference for domestic material (Buy
American). [Ref. 6:p. 16]
The Government should want to enhance contractor perfor-
mance, but because of the unique defense acquisition environ-
ment, many other influences come in to play in the final
determination of how and to whom a contract is awarded.
Statutory and regulatory restraints limit the contracting
officer's flexibility in the award of contracts. Limited
flexibility in source selection tends to limit the use of
certain incentives. The amount of short term profit payable
to contractors on negotiated procurement is limited by the
weighted guidelines profit determination method. The
Government is also limited by the regulations placed on
advance payments, progress payments, and multi-year
contracting, all of which are effective contracting
incentives. [Ref. 6:p. 17]
In any contractual arrangement between a contractor and a
client, both parties will try to promote their interests by
introducing contract conditions that will protect their final
goals. [Ref. 7:p. 23]
Studies conducted in the area of incentive contracts are
in general agreement that short term profit maximization is
not the typical defense contractor major motivation.
Short term profit is not a defense contractor's only
concern. Defense contracts are sought to cover payroll and
overhead costs, and to provide company personnel with the
opportunity to develop technical and managerial skills
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useful in commercial and defense business. Once a contract
is won, a company seeks every opportunity to add work and
funds to the program. The need for follow on work is
crucial, since (1) the initial effort to secure a contract
involves a large outlay of money, and (2) there is usually
long time laps between contracts for the same weapons
systems. [Ref. 8:p. 27]
The presumption of short term profit as the basic motive
of industry is true in that in the open market the firm will
not survive without profit. For DOD, it is an overly
simplistic approach since it is based on a questionable
assumption of operating in an open market. Also, it is a
general assumption applied as a rule to almost all ontracts.
[Ref 4:p. 37]
As a general observation, profitability of Government
business when compared to other business (commercial) showed
an average of 14.8% profit before taxes for commercial
business compared to 5.6% profit for Government business.
[Ref. 4:p. 39] This type of analysis might be misleading in
that the Government awards many cost reimbursement contracts
where the risk to the contractor is significantly reduced.
This may skew the data towards an indication that profit on
Government contracts is substantially less then in commercial
business, however what must be measured is profit on the same
level of risk.
With the majority of studies indicating that short term
profit is not the major motivating factor for defense
contractors, it is a paradox that this is the main factor in
the current structure of incentive contracts. One opinion is
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that the DOD policy evolved to its current state because it is
easy for contracting officers to understand. Profit maximiza-
tion principles have been ingrained to most contracting
officers. [rTcf. 8:p. 28] Another factor is that when
incentive contracts were evolving, what started as rules of
thumb (profit maximization) became hard and fast rules. [Ref.
4]
Incentive contracts, termed economically as a linear
payment schedule, are contracts where the buyer pays a fixed
fee plus some proportion of project cost. The remaining
proportion of project costs is borne by the seller. The
seller's proportion is usually called the sharing ratio. A
higher sharing ratio creates more incentive to reduce cost.
It also makes the contractor bear more risk. An optimal
sharing ratio depends on uncertainty, risk aversion, and
contractor's ability to control costs. Economists state that
an efficient incentive contract can be derived by clearly
showing the tradeoff between risk sharing and incentives.
[Ref. 9:p. 719] A balance must be struck between the positive
incentive effect of a high sharing ratio and the negative risk
effect.
The effectiveness of incentives as instruments of
motivation cannot be measured by examining contract results
alone. Research in the area of incentive effectiveness did
not reveal exactly the same results, however several findings
were common. They include:
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1. A contractor rarely seeks to maximize profits during the
short run of a single contract.
2. Incentives have not been effective as protection against
cost growth.
3. Incentives are costly to negotiate and administer, to
both the Government and contractors.
4. Contractors will not sacrifice performance attainment
for short term profit on a single contract. Performance
is of such paramount importance to company image and
future business acquisitions that performance incentives
provide little if any additional motivation to the
contractor.
5. It is often impossible to pass incentive motivation to
the people who carry out the contract effort on a day to
day basis, primarily because it is difficult to relate
individual activity with any specific contract.
6. When a contractor discovers that his incentive
arrangements do not correspond to the Government's
interest, he ignores the incentive.
7. Incentives serve to discipline the planning efforts of
DOD personnel. (requirement analysis is more thorough)
[Ref. 6:p. 26]
The major problem with incentive contracts seems to be that
the Government has a hard time determining an appropriate
target cost, an essential element of all incentive contracts.
If the target cost is too high, there can be little incentive
to control costs. The resulting underruns are not the result
of increased efficiency. If the target cost is too low, the
contractor will not meet the target cost without compromising
the product. The problem is created because it is in the
contractor's best interest to have a high target cost and in
the Government's best interest to have a low one. The
contractor has an incentive to distort estimates concerning
true expected costs. The problem can be reduced by specifying
12
the relationship between target cost and sharing ratio. The
objective of the contracting officer is to get the contractor
to reveal true expected costs.
The second major problem is that the Government's policy
implies that for an incentive to be effective the contractor
must be motivated by extra profits on a particular contract.
It ignores the other contractor motivators. (Ref. 6:p. 28]
Another side to contractor motivation consists of
penalties. Penalties sometimes are better motivators than
rewards. If an incentive is structured in a manner that it
definitely motivates the contractor, penalties or negative fee
might not be applicable. But in the defense contracting
world, where there are strong drives to incur costs, penalties
might be appropriate. The best type of penalties seem to be
a form where the contractor starts out with a maximum fee and
can only lose it. (Ref. 10] There is a risk that contrac-
tors will not bid if excessive penalties are imposed. It is
apparent that in order for incentives to work they must be in
areas that motivate the contractor. Contractor motivation is
complex and is a function of many contract and non-contract
factors, beyond short term profit. Government should consider
motivation in pre-award planning. The emphasis of incentives
should reside in cost control rather than maximization of
short term profit. Penalties should be used on the over-run
side of targets. More attention should be paid to the extra
ccntractual factors when selecting contract structures.
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If profit on a single contract (short term profit) is not
the major contractor motivator, the current structure of
incentive contracts must be changed. Expanded incentive
contract types should be developed as opposed to the basic
incentive contracts promulgated in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation. With factors such as company growth, market
share, and guarantee of follow on work determined to outweigh
short term profit, perhaps statutory and regulatory changes
should be enacted that will allow contracting officers to
develop incentive contracts that provide for follow on work if
certain goals are met. Penalties should be used with
discretion, as reduction in the industrial base because of
Government micro management and burdensome paperwork has
become apparent.
John J. Kennedy, author of "Incentive Contracts and Cost
Growth" says about incentives:
Most incentives, even if they were well constructed, are
destroyed by the administrative process. To have any
chance of being effective, the goals have to be meaningful,
achievable, and the rewards allocated in a timely manner.
Right now, all these requirements are undermined by the
administrative process.
In light of the current statutes and regulations it is
necessary for contracting officers to recognize motivational
factors besides profit, and determine which factors will
stimulate and motivate the contractor to improve his perfor-
mance. The proper motivational tool must be incorporated into
the contract, and then the contract must be properly admin-
istered to ensure effective results. [Ref. 8:p. 28]
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C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACT TYPES
Contract types vary according to the responsibility
assumed by the contractor for the costs of performance and the
amount and nature of the profit incentive offered to the
contractor for achieving or exceeding specified standards.
The contract types are split into two categories. These are
fixed price contracts and cost reimbursement contracts.
1. Fixed-Price Contracts
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states,
Fixed-Price contracts provide for a firm price or, in
appropriate cases, an adjustable price. Fixed-price
contracts, providing for an adjustable price may include a
ceiling price, a target price (including target cost), or
both. Unless otherwise specified in the contract, the
ceiling price or target price is subject to adjustment only
by operation of the contract clauses providing for
equitable adjustment or other revision of the contract
price under stated circumstances. [Ref. l:p. 16.201]
This type of contract "locks in" the price of the product or
service at the time of contract award and does not allow any
adjustment in contract price, except as may be allowed by
specific contract clauses incorporated into the contract.
a. Firm-Fixed-Price Contract
A Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract places the
burden of cost risk on the contractor and "provides maximum
incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform
effectively and it imposes a minimum burden upon the
contracting parties" (Ref. l:p. 16.202-1].
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A firm fixed-price contract is suitable for
acquiring commercial products or commercial-type products or
for acquiring other supplies or services on the basis of
detailed specifications when the contracting officer can
establish fair and reasonable prices at the outset.
Establishment of a fair and reasonable price entails attaining
adequate price competition. It is important that in FFP
situations, performance uncertainties can be identified and a
reasonable estimate of their costs are available.
b. Other Fixed-Price Contracts
Besides firm-fixed-price, other major fixed price
contract types that are discussed in the FAR include:
(1) Fixed-price with economic price (FPE)
adjustments which allow adjustment in final price based on
input material price changes. This type of contract can be
utilized when there is instability in market or labor
conditions.
(2) Fixed-price incentive (FPI) is a fixed-price
contract that provides for adjusting profit and establishing
the final contract price by a formula based on the relation-
ship of final negotiated total cost to total target cost. An
FPI contract is appropriate when the parties can negotiate at
the outset a firm target cost, a target profit, a profit
adjustment formula that will provide for a fair and reasonable
incentive, and a ceiling that provides for the contractor to
assume an appropriate share of the risk. FPI contracts can
16
have a firm target (FPIF) or successive targets (FPIS) which
can be used when all pricing information is not available at
the onset of negotiations.
2. Cost-Reimbursement Contracts
Cost-reimbursement contracts provide for payment of
allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the
contract. These contracts establish an estimate of total cost
for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a ceiling
that the contractor may not exceed without approval of the
contracting officer. Cost-reimbursement contracts are
considered suitable when uncertainties involved in contract
performance do not permit costs to be estimated with
sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract.
The major cost contracts discussed in the FAR include:
a. Cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts are cost-
reimbursement contracts that provide for payment to the
contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception
of the contract. This contract type permits contracting for
efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk to
contractors, but it provides only a minimum incentive to
control costs.
b. Cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts are cost-
reimbursement contract that provide for an initially
negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the
relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs.
This contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee,
17
minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula. After
contract performance, the fee payable to the contractor is
determined in accordance with the formula. The fee adjustment
formula should provide an incentive that will be effective
over the full range of foreseeable variances from the target
cost.
c. Cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts are a cost-
reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of
a base amount fixed at inception of the contract and an award
amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in part during
performance and that is sufficient to provide motivation for
excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical
ingenuity, and cost effective management. The amount to be
paid is determined by the Government's subjective evaluation
of the contractor's performance in terms of the criteria
stated in the contract.
D. AWARD FEE CONTRACTS
Under award fee provisions a Government monitor
unilaterally determines all or part of a contractor's fee on
the basis of subjective, after the fact evaluation of
contractor performance. A concept similar to the award fee
has existed in Federal contracts since the 1950's, however
extensive use of the award fee technique did not occur until
the 1960's when NASA and the Navy utilized award fee contracts




The academic framework of the concept is usually
attributed to Frederic M. Scherer, who devotes a full chapter
in his 1964 work, "The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic
Incentives", to after the fact evaluation. Scherer's proposed
incentive strategy, like the award fee practice common today,
relied on retrospective evaluations of contractor performance
by "knowledgeable persons of sound judgement". [Ref. 12:p.
329] He went on to propose that a central organization of 6
to 10 such persons, called a Performance Evaluation Board,
would make periodic, after the fact contractor evaluations and
control bias in those evaluations. He expected that the board
would use a variety of evaluation factors for each assessment
and that the contractor would subsequently be rewarded for
effective performance either by high profit or opportunity for
sales. [Ref. 12]
The award fee in use today contains a fee structure that
consists of a fixed amount, called the base fee, that does not
vary with performance and which could be zero; and an award
amount, called the award fee pool, which, in addition to the
fixed amount, is earned according to preestablished criteria.
It is used to encourage the attainment of excellent contract
performance. Under an award fee arrangement, the base fee is
designed to compensate the contractor for factors such as risk
assumption, investment, and the nature of the work. The award
fee pool represents an additional amount available to the
contractor to earn for performance that demonstrates quality
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efforts towards accomplishing the tasks and functions required
by the contract. [Ref. ll:p. 4]
The FAR describes the award portion of the CPAF contract
in the following manner:
* , . an award amount that a contractor may earn in whole
or in part during performance and that is sufficient to
provide motivation for excellence in such areas as quality,
timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost effective
management. The amount of the award fee to be paid is
determined by the Government's judgmental evaluation of the
contractor's performance in terms of the criteria stated in
the contract. This determination is made unilaterally by
the Government and is not subject to the Disputes clause.
[Ref. 1:p. 16.404-2 (a)]
The fact that the award fee can be based on subjective evalua-
tion and cannot be disputed relieves the Government of the
fear that the contractor would challenge the evaluation of the
Government. Therefore, the Government is free to evaluate
performance subjectively, as long as the award criteria
delineated is adhered to. Utilization of CPAF contracts is
authorized when it is not considered feasible or effective to
use a contract that uses predetermined objective incentives
applicable to cost, technical performance or schedule.
Consideration is also warranted to the fact that meeting
acquisition objectives will be enhanced by using the contract.
Specifically, in terms of contract administration, what must
be considered is that any additional administrative effort and
cost required to monitor and evaluate performance must be
justified by the increase in expected benefits. [Ref l:p.
16.404-2 (b) iii]
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The contract by its nature assumes additional adminis-
trative effort and cost are going to be involved. Award fees
are most suitable for use with c,.ntracts in which it is
difficult to measure performance, and where the Government
wants to play an active role in the management of the
contract. However, when it is used, several benefits are
derived from its use. They include:
1. encourages Government-contractor cooperation,
2. assures an active role for Government managers,
3. recognizes limitations on top management ability to
control operations,
4. stimulates formal and informal communication,
5. recognizes variability of motivation,
6. leaves to contractors the task of motivating their own
personnel,
7. views the acquisition process as dynamic,
8. is flexible and provides room for human judgment,
9. simplifies contractual provisions, and
10. helps assure that profits are earned. [Ref. 13:p. 7]
Prior to actual contract administration, it is important
in an award fee contract that appropriate effort and
consideration be devoted in the determination of the
evaluation criteria. An analysis of the performance work
statement should be performed to determine the areas that the
Government considers essential to successful contractor
performance. Performance can be considered over broad
categories, however, each broad category can be broken down
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into more specific elements. The broad categories include,
but are not limited to: performance of work, technical
management, business management, cost control, and quality
control. In selecting performance criteria for the award fee
pool, it is important not to use meaningless or confusing
elements because of the probability that they will lead to
unwanted results or reduce contractor motivation.
Several questions that should be asked of the performance
elements include:
1. Is the element meaningful and important to overall
performance?
2. Is it consistent with other elements in the plan?
3. Is the element sending the right message to the con-
tractor regarding performance? [Ref. 14:p. 10]
Affirmative answers regarding the above questions will
significantly smooth the contract administration process over
the life of the contract.
In the award fee determination process, it is critical
that the award fee plan contain appropriate checks and
balances to maintain impartiality. Monitoring, assessing, and
reporting should be performed by personnel who are familiar
with the contract requirements. In turn the results should be
subject to approval of more senior personnel who are not
involved with day to day operations of the contract. A
layered system of performance evaluation should assure the
Government and the contractor that an informed and reasonable
judgement has been made regarding the amount of the award fee.
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It is especially important to demonstrate impartiality to the
contractor because he does not have the rights provided in
most contracts by the Disputes Clause.
The three basic layers for administering an award fee
contract include:
1. Award Fee Determination Official (AFDO)
2. Award Review Board; and
3. Performance monitoring activities.
Award fee contracting requires that there will be an AFDO and
that this person will be an individual who is at a higher
level organizationally than the people involved directly in
performance evaluation. The AFDO's primary responsibility is
determination of the award fee earned and payable for each
evaluation period and instituting changes to any portion of
the award fee structure as appropriate. (Ref. 14:p. 25]
The Award Review Board is established to evaluate
contractor performance, based on input from the activities
responsible for monitoring contractor performance. In
addition, they recommend the amount of award fee to the AFDO.
The membership of the board should be based on the nature,
dollar value, and complexity of the procurement. [Ref. 14:p.
251
The primary responsibility for monitoring and initial
assessment of contractor performance is assigned to the
Contract Administration Office (CAO). The policies and
procedures for obtaining and providing interagency contract
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administration and audit services are delineated in Part 42 of
the FAR and state that the goals are to, "provide specialized
assistance through field offices located at or near
contractors' establishments, avoid or eliminate overlapping
and duplication of Government effort, and to provide more
consistent treatment of contractors." (Ref. l:p. 42.100]
The Procuring Contracting officer (PCO) delegates contract
administration to the CAO and the CAO provides support to
contract administration.
The Award Fee process and CPAF contract seem to be treated
as just another type of incentive contract, however due to its
uniqueness it has the potential of instilling an improvement
in Government-Contractor relationships. There is evidence
that the award fee process builds team spirit, fosters
communication at all levels, and instills a pride of
belonging. [Ref. 15:p. 468] The award fee process is
considered a management system, far more than it is just a
contract type, and the decision to use an award fee is
fundamentally a selection of a management approach. With an
award fee, the Government has more day to day insight into the
contractor's actions. The contractors activities are also
more visible to the Government. (Ref. 15:p. 469]
Because of the close relationship required, it can be
argued, especially by DOD contracting personnel, that the
Government does not have the time, people, and dollars
available to administer a normal CPAF contract. This
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constraint relates directly to the third consideration of FAR
16.404-2, concerning the cost and administrative effort
involved with using CPAF contracts. The give and take on the
part of the Government and contractor during the award fee
process is very worthwhile from a contract management point of
view, however it results in many hours of work on the part of
the Government. Although, the award fee determination is not
subject to appeal, the AFDO needs to be very certain the
Government's determination is fair. In the real world,
because of the time and cost necessary to administer a CPAF
contract, program managers and contracting personnel are more
likely to utilize a CPFF or CPIF contract for their
requirements. [Ref. 16:p. 486]
From the contractors' point of view, there is strong
evidence that the contractors have strong feelings against too
much involvement in contractor operations. The contractors
like cost-type contracts, but resent too much day to day
interference. However, with experienced competent personnel
to take full advantage of the award fee contract's potential,
the process can be very beneficial. It is important that
meaningless paperwork be minimized and that the process be
matched to the program. [Ref. 15:p. 470]
It is believed that in order to achiieve the full benefits
of th3 award fee process and its superior motivational
elements, efforts need to be made to reduce the administrative
difficulty associated with the use of these contractL. Dr.
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Arthur C. Meiners of Marymount University has proposed a
simplified cost-plus-award-fee contract. The basis behind it
is that evaluation periods would be standardized and that the
award fee determination process would be handled solely by the
AFDO and the applicable Government contracting officer. This
is in keeping with encouragement of streamlining Government
contracting efforts. [Ref. 16:p. 488]
Another proposal that is gaining steam is the use of the
award fee in a fixed-price environment. This idea appears to
be in line with reducing paperwork and administrative
oversight. Perhaps Dr. Meiners' simplified approach to award
fee united with fixed-price contracts could be an answer to
improving contractor performance in Government contracts.
E. FIXED-PRICE-AWARD FEE CONTRACT
The fixed-price-award fee is considered a hybrid type
contract because the contract utilizes two component parts, a
fixed price component and an award fee component. These
components differ substantially from the fixed-price
arrangement in that contractor incentives for performance are
present and the risk apportionment is shifted.
The fixed-price-award fee (FPAF) contract is not
recognized as a specific contract type by the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). In a firm fixed-price (FFP)
contract, all cost risk is borne by the contractor. The FFP
gives the contractor considerable incentive to control costs,
since this would increase his profit. However, this incentive
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tends to be a disadvantage to the Government if the contractor
is only concerned with short term profit on a single contract,
because the contractor could most readily control costs by
sacrificing quality. [Ref. 17]
In the FPAF, the "award fee" is a bonus for higher than
standard levels of performance. If the contractor expends no
effort to meet those higher levels, it incurs no risk and
earns no fee. If the contractor expends effort and resources
to achieve a higher performance level, a part of the Award Fee
is earned. This incentive approach should not force the
contractor to undertake high risk, but provides motivation to
undertake some risk in order to get a better return on
investment. The maximum fee percentage is specified in the
contract, and the amount received is determined unilaterally
by the Government on assessments of performance periodically
over the terms of the contract.
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III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FIXED-PRICE-AWARD
FEE CONTRACTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The economic theory of procurement is intended to describe
the acquisition of items, particularly major weapons systems
or other large scale, high dollar value items, utilizing
economic factors and trade-offs. Using economic theory to
help determine the appropriate contract type could be a
valuable indicator as to which pricing arrangement a
Government contracting officer should utilize for the various
procurements under their cognizance. In narrowing down the
scope of this thesis, the question becomes whether to use a
Fixed-Price-Award-Fee (FPAF) or a Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP)
contract. This chapter is intended to describe, from an
economic point of view, what factors should be assessed to
make that determination.
B. ECONOMIC THEORY
A contract between the Government and a contractor can be
described ecoromically as a principal-agent relationship. A
principal-agent relationship exists when the Government wants
to employ the contractor to develop a product or perform a
service. Principal-agent or Government-contractor conflicts
arise because both parties have different objectives. The
Government usually wants to minimize cost for a given perfor-
mance level and scheduled delivery. The contractor can
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be motivated by short term profits on the specific contract or
other long term objectives. Specific contractor motivations
are discussed in Chapter IV. Obviously, because the
objectives of the Government and the contractor are different,
and information is critical for price negotiations, the
sharing of all information concerning the project does not
occur.
The cost of obtaining information concerning all aspects
of performance in a particular procurement is critical, from
an economic standpoint, in determining whether to use an FFP
or an FPAF contract. A firm fixed-price contract usually
requires that the Government and the contractor have a great
amount of information concerning the actual cost of
performance, prior to the negotiating a final price. The
cost of obtaining this information should be a factor in the
final price awarded for a firm-ficd-p i r.
The amount of information available to both the Government
and the contractor can also be associated with the amount of
risk involving a particular contract. Increased information
obviously reduces uncertainty and therefore reduces risk for
the party that obtains the information. The Government can
reduce the amount of uncertainty by expending resources to
obtain additional information for this particular purchase or
by drawing on experience from procuring a similar item. A
contractor can also reduce uncertainty and risk by obtaining
additional information or drawing on past experience in
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manufacturing a similar or equal item. If this has not
occurred, and the amount of risk associated with the
procurement is considered excessive, then most likely the
Government is in a situation where a firm-fixed-price or
fixed-price-award-fee is not a viable option. A cost type
contract would most likely be utilized in this situation.
The amount of information required in determining the
contract type is dependent on the level of detail required to
specify the level of performance. In the case of the choice
between an FFP and an FPAF contract, there must be enough
information available to both parties that there is no
excessive risk. However, it may be ill-advised to write a
firm-fixed-price contract because of the difficulty or cost
involved in specifying the desired level of performance in
advance.
The reason that this difficulty occurs is that better
information may become available at a later time. In this
situation, the Government's cost of obtaining this information
is not necessarily a monetary cost, rather it may be a time
cost if there is a delay in meeting schedule requirements
while waiting for additional information. Suppose the
Government can specify a minimum requirement, but believes
that improvements in desired performance will become known in
the future. If schedule requirements are such that immediate
award is necessary, a fixed-price-award-fee contract may be a
viable and desirable option. Under such circumstances, the
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award fee may be used to effectively communicate and
incorporate such information into the product. In this
situation, in general, the later the modification the costlier
the product. These are performance-cost tradeoffs that can be
dealt with after awarding the contract by using an award fee.
The desired improvement may not be limited to an
improvement in level of performance, but could also be an
improvement in the desired level of quality.
Another situation could exist where the Government is just
unable or doesn't want to economically specify all the
performance requirements at the beginning of the contract
(i.e., at the time of award). This may be true even if the
Government knows exactly what it wants at the time of contract
award. In this case, the Government could use the award fee,
its evaluation criteria, and subsequent evaluations over the
life oi the contract as a method of influencing the contractor
to perform in a prescribed manner. This may be considered
preferable by the Government in that this type of consultation
and monitoring may be more economical and efficient.
C. ELEMENTS AND USE OF AN ECONOMIC MODEL
An economic model to contrast firm-fixed-price and fixed-
price-award-fee can be used to demonstrate, in theory, the
differences discussed above. Construction of this type of
model includes the following characteristics:
The model must specify the minimum acceptable level of
performance at the beginning of the contract and the
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requirements that must be satisfied in the fixed-price portion
of the FPAF (i.e., the deliverable product or service). The
next step is determining the level of performance that would
achieve an award from the award fee pool. An additional
factor that must be considered in this area involves the rate
at which the actual performance becomes more accurate in
meeting the desired level of performance.
The next important element concerns contractor profit.
Without any additional award from the award fee pool, this is
a function of the fixed price paid by the Government minus the
contractor's cost in producing at that performance level.
Contractor's profit must be adjusted when performance is
successfully improved and part or all of the award fee pool is
awarded. In this case, the increase in the contractor profit
is determined by the amount of award fee paid by the
Government minus contractor's cost in meeting the modification
that resulted in the payment of award fee.
Another measurement factor involves the net benefit to the
Government. Net benefit to the Government, assuming no extra
effort (i.e., no payment of award fee), includes the benefit
from the product it receives minus the payment on the fixed-
price portion of the contract. However, the Government incurs
a cost in obtaining the information necessary to prepare the
initial contract. This cost must also be subtracted.
Net benefit to the Gcvernment is slightly different when
additional effort is expended by the contractor, resulting in
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the payment of an award fee. This increase in the net benefit
is the benefit achieved from the improved product minus
Government cost for the award fee payment. Subtracted from
this would be the costs to the Government in administering a
FPAF contract. As discussed in later chapters, research has
concluded this cost can be extensive.
Once constructed, this basic model can be utilized to help
determine award fee structure. In a situation where perfect
information exists for the Government and the contractor, the
award fee structure will reflect the cost to the contractor
and benefit or value to the Government. If this is the case,
then the award fee pool will always be greater than or equal
to the cost the contractor incurs for the extra effort, but
less than or equal to the value as perceived by the
Government. In addition, with perfect information, the rate
at which the award fee pool is distributed should be constant
over the life of the project or service.
Usually perfect information does not exist. Therefore, it
is important to look at situations involving imperfect
information. In a forthcoming paper titled, "Fixed Price
Award Fee Structure iii an Uncertain Environment", Dr. K. L.
Terasawa and Dr. W. R. Gates of the Naval Postgraduate School
theorized that award fee could be used to compel contractors
to reveal their true expectations concerning the extra effort
and cost in improving performance on a particular procurement.
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In this situation, the amount of the award fee pool is
based on the contractor's self admitted difficulty for a
specific level of effort over and above the minimum
requirements of the procurement. Basically, the award fee
pool has an inverse relationship with what *he contractor says
is the required level of effort. The easier he states that
the level of effort required will be, the larger the award fee
pool, within the dollar limits specified by the customer.
This increase in the award fee pool can be viewed as a payment
for more accurate information. To prevent the contractor from
underestimating the level of effort solely to increase the
award fee pool, the rate at which the award fee pool is
distributed can be manipulated. The amount of award granted
decreases as shortcomings in performance increase. To offset
the incentive to underestimate the level of effort, the
amount of award fee granted should decline more quickly as the
size of the award fee pool increases (i.e. as the estimated
level of effort required decreases). In theory, this arrange-
ment will force the contractor to reveal the true level of
effort and associated costs and provide this information to
the Government.
D. CONCLUSION
Once a contracting officer has determined a fixed-price
contract is appropriate for a particular procurement, certain
factors can be reviewed to determine if a fixed-price-award-
fee, as opposed to firm-fixed-price, is an advantageous
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pricing arrangement. The level of detail in a specific level
of performance and the associated costs in obtaining the
required information must be reviewed. Usually a firm-fixed-
price contract requires a greater cost associated with
obtaining the level of information necessary to reduce
uncertainty and risk. However, the administrative costs of a
firm-fixed-price contract are much lower than those associated
with a fixed-price-award-fee. In some cases, an FPAF can
allow the award of a contract to occur more expediently and
still can result in obtaining a desired level of performance
through use of an award fee. Information concerning that
desired level of performance may not have been available when
the contract was awarded. If a firm-fixed-price contract had
been awarded that desired level of performance, initially
unknown, would never have been achieved. Yet, with an award
fee, it may be possible to achieve improved performance
without a significant schedule delay.
In addition, award fee could be utilized to determine the
proper structure and size of the award fee pool, as well as
the rate of disbursement.
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IV. MOTIVATION AND FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE
A. INTRODUCTION
Contractor motivation is a critical factor in the
successful completion of a Government procurement action.
Incorporation of the "best" motivators when writing a contract
is when a contracting officer has the most influence over the
contractor regarding the performance of the required action.
Award fee can be viewed as a continuous motivational method
and can be described as a management process that spans the
life of the contract. This differs from other contract types
in that the span of control and changes in the type of control
are limited once other types of contracts are awarded.
Government motivation can be increased by use of an award
fee in that the Government still has the power to
significantly influence and motivate the contractor after the
contract is awarded. Specifically, with the evaluation
criteria, the Government can select the areas they would like
to influence and direct.
The fixed price portion of the FPAF contains its own
motivational ability in that more efficient performance by the
contractor in completing the contract will increase profit.
Government motivation in the fixed-price arena is that a




Victor Vroos, a noted behavioralist, stated that the
strength of a person's desire or aversion for "something" is
founded not on its intrinsic properties, but on the
anticipated satisfaction or dissatisfaction associated with
other outcomes to which they are expected to lead. [Ref. 19]
Effective motivation of Defense contractors begins with
good planning. The Government must assemble information on
the product to be acquired, the Government constraints, the
proposed contractor's objectives, and the proposed
contractor's constraints. [Ref. 4]
Information on the contractor's objectives and constraints can
be obtained through items such as cost and pricing data. In
addition knowledge of labor supply, interest rates, stock
price, and other business endeavors can allow the Government
insight into the contractor's financial position and produc-
tion capabilities. Trade journals can provide information on
the contractor's environment.
It almost goes without saying that for a truly effective
incentive program, the Government by work or deed must
insure the contractor his objectives can best be met by
helping to accomplish the Government's objectives. [Ref.
5]
Since award fee is a management process with steady
communication between the Government and the contractor, there
is a greater probability that consensus on the objectives can
be achieved.
It is widely accepted that factors other than profit have
a profound influence on contractor motivation. Profit can be
viewed as a "satisfier rather than a motivator. Contractors,
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in most cases, will not perform without a certain profit
level. Once that level of profit is achieved, they may not
increase performance with additional profits alone." [Ref. 8]
Although award fee provides additional profit for increased
levels of performance, other motivational factors are
involved.
Award fee contracting relies on more than just the profit
motive. The evaluations conducted by the Government on the
specified basis formally advise the contractor and ti
individuals employed by the contractor on the amount of fee
awarded as well as the reasons for the award or absence of
award. These evaluations are reinforcement of the
contractor's performance or a penalty. This type of
evaluation has an effect on the pride of an organization, the
managers, and the workers and can act as an additional
incentive. Thus, without even considering profit to the
contractor, the evaluation can have a motivating impact on the
managers and employees. [Ref. 20]
Abraham Maslow, in his famous study on the hierarchy of
needs, found that the strongest motivation of man, after the
basic needs of food, shelter, and a sense of belonging are
met, is a need for esteem. [Ref. 21] The award fee process
satisfies this need for esteem through the feedback of the
evaluation and the fee awarded. Even if the cash portion of
the award does not flow to managers and workers, the feedback
of the evaluation can act as an ominous motivator. [Ref. 20]
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The effective use of the evaluation process allows the
managers and workers of the contractor to see what the
Government likes and dislikes. It also gives the contractor
an incentive to make the decisions and undertake the risk that
is perceived as most beneficial to the evaluators. [Ref. 20]
C. CONTRACTOR OBJECTIVES
Objectives of the Government and the contractors cannot be
pegged to a single, all-encompassing objective, rather there
are multiple objectives on the part of both parties. The
trouble is that in all too many cases only one objective is
incentivised and other pertinent objectives are ignored. A
disadvantage noted concerning incentive contracts is the
Government's inability to incentivise simultaneously all the
important aspects of a contract. When a single one is
incentivised, usually the Government allows the requirements
of other elements to slip. [Ref. 4:p. 22]
This is where the elements of an award fee can be of
greater success than other types of incentives. Several
performance elements can be incentivised simultaneously with
an award fee, overcoming one of the biggest disadvantages of
other contract types.
Contractor objectives can be divided into contractual
objectives and long term corporate goals. Specific objectives
of the contractor usually include earning profits (short term
and long term), insuring company growth, providing a good
product, maintaining or increasing market share, developing
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new skills, guaranteeing follow on work, minimizing risk,
controlling one's destiny, safeguarding proprietary interests,
utilizing excess capacity, and improving cash flow. [Ref.
6:p. 15] Review of past performance can identify objectives
that were obtained previously. However, most research in the
field of determining contractor objectives was conducted by
asking the contractors to list their most important
objectives. (Usually the top 3).
Once the prioritized objectives of a specific contractor
have been determined, contractor performance will be improved
if the Government helps in the achievement of these
objectives. Award fee can be utilized as an incentive for
many of the common objectives noted. For example, if the
contractor sets up his operation to produce a higher quality
product than required by the minimum specifications of the
Government, in an attempt to receive more award fee, this may
allow the use of excess capacity. The award fee could provide
additional funds to pursue more efficient technology. Award
fees can obviously improve cash flow if the amount of the
award fee exceeds the additional cost of the risk undertaken.
Indirectly, achieving a top quality product could possibly
lead to follow on work, because the final product is so much
better than the competition.
40
D. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVATION
The Government, like the contractor, has many different
objectives on any given contract. Three primary objectives
include:
1. Obtaining the items specified in the contract.
2. Obtaining it at a fair and reasonable price.
3. Delivery of the item in a timely manner.
Other contractual objectives include socio-economic
objectives. (i.e., Buy American) These extra-contractual
objectives significantly affect Government contractual
bchavior, other than the natural desire to motivate
contractors. The Government is under significant legal and
formal constraints. Because of this Government contracting
officers usually have little autonomy in conducting
contracting operations. Basically the Government is
vulnerable to many external sources, including Congressmen who
may be influenced by the desires of their contractor
constituents.
Award fee could be used specifically for many of the
Government objectives. For example, part of the award fee
pool could be awarded for the achievement of Small and
Disadvantaged Business goals by major contractors. The amount
of the award fee pool could be dependent on the fixed price
the Government and contractor agree on. If it were inversely
related, the contractor would have an objective to keep the
fixed price portion of the contract as low as reasonably
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possible. Care must be taken in this case to prevent "buying
in" in hopes of making up the difference with award fee money.
It must be paramount that the award fee only be awarded for
additional effort that results in something of value for the
Government.
One of the most important Government objectives concerns
design to cost (DTC). DTC is a managerial concept where
explicit cost goals are set during development. In a
development contract, DTC is implemented through a design to
unit production cost (DTUPC) provision to ensure the
contractor controls cost. Researchers have determined award
fee has a "statistically significant" influence on DTUPC
attainment and it can influence DTUPC. [Ref. 22:p. ii] These
studies were based on Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contracts. I,. FPAF
contracts, some cost control motivation has been achieved by
use of a fixed-price contract. However, award fee influence
could be used to control costs incurred to design a product
superior to the minimum requirements specified by the
Government.
Government motivation to utilize award fee can be severely
diminished if the award fee is set up in a method that
requires Government resources that are not available. The
administration of an award fee contract could possibly
overwhelm, in time and people, any savings achieved by use of
the contract type.
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E. FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE TO ACHIEVE QUALITY
Quality of products or services is a significant factor in
the attainment of company growth and increases in market
share. However, quality of products also has an effect on the
prestige of a firm. Quality obviously leads to prestige in
almost every market. Quality is of such extreme importance,
firms have embraced programs such as Total Quality Management
(TQM) as preached by E. Deming, as well as other types of
similar quality programs.
Attainment of quality requires all managers and employees
of a firm to be involved in the process. Quality programs,
such as TQM, require a culture where quality is built in to
the manufacturing inspection. As stated previously, it
requires the support of all involved. [Ref. 22]
Award fee lends itself to this total involvement. As
stated previously, award fee is a management process in which
the evaluation process can affect all of the individuals
involved. Therefore, it lends itself to improvement of quality
in products or service. It can be a motivational approach
that affects junior or non-supervisory contractor personnel,
who in many cases have a significant impact on eventual
quality.
F. FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTOR MOTIVATION
The most basic incentive in contracting is involved in the
fixed-price contract. In a firm-fixed-price (FFP) contract,
all cost risk is borne by the contractor. The contractor
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provides a product or a specified level of service for a
.pecified period of time for a specific price. The FFP gives
the contractor considerable incentive to control costs, since
this would increase his profit. Contracting literature
generally states that FFP contracts work well for simple
functions which are easily defined and subject to minimal or
no change.
G. FIXED-PRICE GOVERNMENT MOTIVATION
A firm-fixed-price contract requires a delivery of a
product or service to the Government. The costs to the
Government in this type of contract are fixed. The resulting
incentive for the contractor to control costs and increase
short profits could be a disadvantage to the Government. This
is because contractors can control costs by possibly "cutting
corners" and sacrificing quality. This is a short term profit
objective in that the poor quality of the delivered product
could affect future contract awards to the firm.
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V. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A telephone survey of Government and defens- contractor
'ontracting personnel was conducted to determine possible
advantages and disadvantages of the Fixed-Price-Award-Fee
contract by those individuals who would be involved in the
award and administration of such contracts for their
Government procurement offices or their companies. The survey
involved conversations with 16 individuals who were deeply
involved in the contracting arena for their employer. The
results of the survey were compiled to determine the major
areas of concern for the Government from the Government point
of view and the contractor from the contractor point of view.
Many opinions and thoughts concerning award fee and the FPAF
contract type were expressed, however, most of the findings
fell into the categories noted below.
A. ADVANTAGES TO THE GOVERNMENT IN UTILIZING A FIXED-PRICE-
AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
1. Communication
The fixed-price-award-fee contract is an incentive
structure that offers several advantages to the Government
when it is employed. The advantages available are dependent
on how the contract is used. A survey of Government
contracting officers and administrators indicated that the
award fee places the Government in a better position to obtain
the performance that they desire. Furthermore, an award fee,
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either with a cost or fixed-price contract type, allows more
and better communication between the Government and the
contractor.
The award fee structure, with its periodic evalua-
tions, ensured that relevant communication occurred on a
regular and continuous basis. The Gcvernment personnel
interviewed felt that this in itself was a definite advantage
because there were "no surprises" for either side if the award
fee evaluations were used properly. All necessary personnel
were aware of and familiar with the contract situation at any
given time. With the award fee the Government has more daily
interaction with the contractor and greater insight into the
contractor's actions. Care must be taken to ensure that with
involvement of large numbers of Government anl contractor
personnel specific decision responsibility lines are
maintained. If lines of responsibility are not maintained
critical decisions could be decided by unauthorized personnel
leading to an undesired outcome. This diffusion of the
responsibility could undermine the success of the contractual
agreement.
2. Responsiveness
The award fee's periodic evaluations were conducted on
a regular basis that varied from monthly to semi-annually as
indicated by the personnel interviewed. Government personnel
felt the evaluations contributed to the contractor's
willingness to cooperate with the Government on the evaluation
46
criteria. Government personnel felt the contractor was
significantly more responsive to the Government's requests or
desires when addressed through the use of award fee. The
flexibility of the award fee, in changing evaluation criteria
throughout the life of the contract, allowed the Government to
shift the emphasis of the contractor's efforts as often as
there were evaluation periods. The responsiveness of the
contractor is increased significantly if the evaluation
periods are of shorter duration.
3. Risk Assignment
The fixed-price portion of the award fee ensures that
a deliverable product will be produced or else the contractor
will be in default of the contract. This is a profound
difference from cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts in that
cost contracts, by their nature, only require the contractor's
best efforts towards successful completion of the requirement
specified in the contract. The FAR states:
A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is
not subject to any adjustment on the basis of contractor's
cost experience in performing the contract. This contract
places upon the contractor maximum risk and full
responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.
It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control
costs and perform effectively. [Ref. l:p. 16.202]
Maximum risk is placed on the contractor because he is
responsible for delivery of the specified product. Since
there is basically a guarantee that the contractor will
deliver, the award fee portion can then be used to achieve
"better than average" performance on that deliverable product.
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In addition, both the maximum potential award fee pool are
pre-specified in a FPAF contract. Thus, Government contract-
ing personnel are not "worried" that large sums of money will
be spent without anything to show for it.
4. Motivational Tool
In the survey Government personnel felt the award fee
was an effective motivational tool that could be utilized to
obtain more effective performance by the contractor. The
additional profit that could be earned could be very
effective, especially if the contractor's main concern was
profit. The critical element in this area was that the award
fee pool be of an adequate amount to effectively act as a
motivator.
In a situation involving a requirement dictating equal
effort throughout the life, such as a services contract, it is
critical that the award fee pool be evenly distributed, if
earned, throughout the life of the contract. This is
necessary to ensure that each evaluation period was considered
of equal importance by the contractor. If too much of the
pool was awarded early, Government personnel felt the
contractor "slacked off" in his performance because he has
already earned the bulk of what was available and there was no
point in providing extra effort above the minimum requirement.
Basically, if too much of the award fee was awarded early in
the life of the contract, the contract lost its motivational
ability.
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If the effort desired and structured to be awarded through
the award fee pool requires differences in effort and risk it
is not prudent for the award fee pool be evenly distributed.
Greater effort and risk incurred by the contractor should be
rewarded with the appropriate award fee amount.
5. Subjective Evaluation not Subject to Dispute
The Government official has the authority to determine
if the criteria have been met and how much the Government
feels the effort is worth. At the same time, they do not have
to worry about the possibility of their decision being
disputed. Government officials felt this was a notable
advantage of award fee contracts.
B. DISADVANTAGES TO THE GOVERNMENT IN USING A FIXED-PRICE-
AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
1. Burdensome
The effective and fair administration of an award fee
was extremely burdensome on Government personnel. Most
Government personnel felt that they didn't have the manpower
or resources to administer very many award fee contracts.
Although many agreed that the fixed price portion of an FPAF
significantly reduced the administrative burden in comparison
with a CPAF, the actual administration and distribution of the
award fee was very difficult and required a great deal of
paperwork on the part of the Government. A case in point,
Government personnel gave examples of evaluation criteria that
ranged from five to six goals covering two pages to thirty
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goals listed over 42 pages. The latter being very difficult,
if not impossible, to administer properly.
Almost all Government personnel were adamant in
insisting the award fee goals and criteria be kept to the
minimum required to achieve the most important elements of the
contract. The greater the number and extent of criteria the
more the contractor feels the Government is too involved ir
his day to day operation. The contractor would be stifled by
the bureaucratic involvement of the Government. It could
cause the contractor to ignore the goals required for the
award fee and become content with meeting minimum standards.
This would limit his profit to the amount determined by the
fixed price portion of the contract. He would incur no
additional risk, the Government would not obtain any
additional quality, and the award fee would be rendered
useless.
The number of people that are involved on the part of
Government in the administration of an award fee is
substantial. Correct administration rec ires a detached third
party to act as award fee determining official. In addition,
representatives are required from each of the parties
involved. These participants should have some hands-on
experience and people with the proper qualification could be
difficult to locate.
Some Government personnel specifically noted that the
burden of administering an award lessens the contract's
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attractiveness and that they would be more inclined to use a
fixed-price incentive type contract if they had the choice.
2. Difficulty in Writing Good Evaluation Criteria
Related to the previous disadvantage was the concern
expressed by many of the personnel interviewed that effective
criteria were very difficult to determine and specify in
writing in the contract. The difficulty arises in determining
what criteria would be the most effective in obtaining the
desired effect. This is what leads to an expansion of
evaluation criteria. In order to be sure that all areas of
concern are covered, Government personnel feel that they can't
limit the criteria and goals. This difficulty is also
dependent on the type of material or service being procured.
The more complex the effort, the more Government personnel
felt evaluation criteria were difficult to establish.
3. Difficult to be Timely
The lack of adequately trained personnel in numbers
sufficient to handle the procurement workload made it
difficult to be timely in evaluation and subsequent award fee
determination and payment. If this area of an award fee
contract is not timely, one of the major benefits of award fee
contracts is lost.
4. Hard to Quantify of How Much of the Award Fee Pool to
Award
Although it is important not to "front load" the award
fee by giving it all to the contractor prior to successful
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performance, Government personnel expressed concern over how
to determine what a specific level of performance is worth in
terms of dollars. If the contractual effort is even
throughout the life of the contract, this is not that great a
problem. However, if there are considerable differences in
level of effort throughout the life of a contract, then being
fair and objective in determining what amount of dollars to
award can be extremely difficult. It also tends to become
arbitrary, which can defeat the incentive of a fixed-price-
award-fee contract.
5. Contractor Gaming
Another concern of Government personnel regarding
award fees is the thought process of the contractor who is
writing a proposal in response to a request for proposal (RFP)
specifying the use of an award fee contract type.
Specifically, it was felt that the contractor would describe
his minimum acceptable effort at a level lower than he might
have otherwise, knowing he could improve on that effort and
thereby achieve a greater share of the award fee pool without
any extra risk or effort.
Prevention of this type of gaming requires that the
Government ensure the statement of work accurately describes
the minimum acceptable level that will satisfy the require-
ment. Then, it is important to ensure that if this is the
level of effort the selected contractor expends, then no award
fee should be awarded. In this case it is important to accept
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that the contractor is only providing what the Government
asked for.
C. ADVANTAGES TO THE CONTRACTOR IN USING A FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-
FEE CONTRACT
1. The Award
If significant, the award is always worth pursuing.
Although it has been established that profit may not always be
the sole motivation of all contractors, for most contractors
it is important. Any opportunity to obtain additional profits
is worth pursuing. Contractor's were very specific that they
would be very willing to cooperate with the Government in any
effort that would provide additional profit. Some of the
contractors interviewed specified that additional profit in
most cases would be indirectly returned to the customer (the
Government) because most of that money would be reinvested in
the company's research and development effort. Research and
development could provide the Government a better product, if
not now, in the future.
2. Communication
Contractors felt that if the evaluation criteria were
reasonable and specific, then communication between the
Government and the contractor was enhanced. Specifically they
felt that they had a definite idea as to what the Government
wanted. They considered this of major importance because some
of the contractors interviewed had been in situations,
involving other contract types, where they had a difficult
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time figuring out what the Government wanted. The routine
evaluations, throughout the life of the contract, continually
provided specific inputs as to what was important to the
customer. Knowledge of what the Government wanted allowed the
contractor to satisfy what is of major importance to most good
contractors in the long run, keeping the customer satisfied.
3. PPAF Allows Flexible Opportunity to Earn Additional
Profit
Discussions with contractor personnel noted that the
use of an award fee with a fixed-price contract constituted an
additional opportunity to earn profit. They felt an FPAF was
a very viable idea and that they would react favorably to its
use. They saw the fixed-price portion of the contract, with
its own assigned profit, as an opportunity to make additional
profit by performing efficiently to achieve the requirements.
After the fixed price portion was considered, they felt that
the award fee was a bonus for performing specific "extra"
items. The fixed price enabled the company to obtain profit
on the minimum effort and product quality specified by the
Government. Then, the award fee gave them the flexibility of
choosing between the extra efforts the Government desired, and
they could choose those areas they felt they could achieve
with minimum risk. If all areas of the evaluation criteria
were attainable they could go for the entire "bonus". Many
considered this the "best of both worlds."
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D. DISADVANTAGES TO THE CONTRACTOR IN USING A FIXED-PRICE-
AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
1. Time Delay Between Evaluation and Payment
Cash flow is extremely important to almost every
defense contractor. Prompt payment by the Government is a
problem even when an award fee is not involved. However, in
order for the Government to optimize the award fee's
motivational capability, payment from the award fee pool
should occur as soon as possible after the evaluation period.
If payment does not occur quickly, the contractor could lose
interest in incurring additional risk to meet the award fee
goals. Many contractors noted delays over 4 months between
the evaluation period and award fee payment based on that
evaluation. For some this meant the next evaluation period
had closed before payment had been received for the previous
period.
2. Biased Evaluation on the Part of Government Personnel
Although the survey research did not note any
instances where contractors believed this actually occurred,
the possibility remains a primary concern of the contractor.
The fear concerns the subjectiveness of the evaluation and the
lack of an avenue for disputes. This is considered an
advantage on the part of the Government, however contractors
suggested that individuals concerned with self promotion and
saving the Government money might not award a fair payment for
the award fee earned. This is especially true if the biased
individual is the award fee determining official (AFDO).
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E. OPTIMAL USES OF FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE BASED UPON CON-
TRACTOR AND GOVERNMENT NOTED ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
The optimal use of a fixed-price-award-fee contract
requires that a significant dollar value be involved and that
the Government be willing to devote sufficient, qualified
personnel resources to ensure the contract is properly written
and administered. It should probably involve a contract that
covers at least two years, to provide for several evaluation
periods in which the Government can express their desires and
the contractor can respond. During the life of a contract,
there should be enough change that quarterly evaluation
perioCds aie n=cssary to keep all pertinent parties informed
of the progress of the contract. If shorter evaluation
periods are required, the Government must be willing to
provide additional personnel to assist in the administration
process. Finally, evaluating officials and the Government
paying office must be prompt in paying the contractor if the
fee is awarded.
The type of product that should be acquired utilizing an
FPAF contract should meet the requirement of a fixed-price
contract in that there should be a certainty that the product
can be produced. Secondly, there should be "room for improve-
ment" between the minimum requirement of the Government and
what can be produced with additional effort. Finally, the
output of this additional effort must be of value to the
Government.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions apply to this research effort.
1. The FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE ensured that relevant
communication occurred between the Government and contractor
on a regular basis. Improved communication significantly
enhanced the quality of the final product. Specifically, for
the contractor, it increased their understanding of what was
required by the Government. By increased understanding of
what was required, contractor's felt it allowed them to keep
the customer satisfied.
2. The major problem to the Government is that the FPAF
is extremely burdensome. Many Government contracting
personnel expressed opposition to the use of any type of award
fee contract because of the demands it placed on their
personnel. The combination with a fixed-price type contract
improved their outlook towards the contract but not
significantly enough to be willing to use the contract type
very often.
3. The major problem expressed by contracting personnel
concerned the time delay between evaluation and payment. This
is obviously related to the burden an award fee contract
places on Government contracting personnel. If this delay
became excessive it completely destroyed the motivational
ability of the FPAF pricing arrangement. In addition, for
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many contractors, cash flow was extremely critical. Any delay
in expected payments caused serious business management
problems for their firm.
4. FPAF is an excellent motivational tool to achieve
quality. Award fee, because of its enhanced communication
ability, can lend itself to the total involvement of all
personnel involved in the manufacturing or service process, if
the evaluations are properly utilized.
5. If the award fee pool is significant, most contractors
welcome the use of a FPAF pricing arrangement. Any
opportunity to earn additional profit is welcome. In
addition, most contractors would be readily willing to invest
the extra time, risk, or investment if the award fee would
cover the cost and provide a reasonable profit or even just
cover overhead and allow growth of the firm.
B. RECO2Jl'DATIONS
1. Fixed-Price-Award-Fee (FPAF) Contracts should only be
utilized if the Government has the resources to
properly administer the contract.
Many Government contract administrators viewed award
fee contracts in general with disdain because they became
impossible to administer properly. Staffs were usually
overburdened and the additional administrative steps necessary
with an award fee contract only added to their burden.
Because they did not have time to ensure evaluations were
conducted properly and award fee pool distributions were fair,
the contract lost its motivational effect. If the company did
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not see prompt results from evaluations, in the form of
payments, they too became disinterested in the contract type.
Government personnel by far favored firm-fixed-price (FFP)
contracts.
2. If contractor responsiveness is of high priority, the
fixed-price-award-fee contract can be very effective.
The ability to change evaluation criteria during the
course of the contract allowed the Government to steer the
contractor in the direction they wanted. It seemed to ensure
the contractor would respond in an efficient and timely
manner. Contractors were significant.y more responsive to
Government requests when addressed through the use of the
award fee. This did require that evaluation periods be
conducted on a regular basis and that the life of the contract
include several evaluation periods.
3. Fixed-Price-Award-Fee will be accepted by the
contractor more easily if the contract requires an
equal level of effort over the life of the contract.
Equal level of effort over the life of the contract
will allow the award fee pool to be equally distributed over
the life of the contract. This will allow the Government to
be fair and reasonable with how the award fee is awarded.
This reduces the chance that the Government will be arbitrary
in its award, which relieves a major concern of many
contractors.
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4. The level of information required can be utilized to
help determine what contract type (FFP or FPAF) would
derive the most net benefit to the Government.
The level of detail in a specific level of performance
and the associated costs in obtaining the required information
can be significant. If flexibility of specifications is a
necessity because of lack of specific information, the Fixed-
Price-Award-Fee contract should be utilized. However, cost
savings in information detail must be weighed against
administrative costs.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. In what situation miQht a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee
contract be utilized to provide for an effective use
of the incentive in the Federal acquisition process?
The best situation for effective use of a Fixed-Price-
Award-Fee is one where the product or service will be provided
over a long period of time, which allows for several evalua-
tion periods adding to the motivational effect. In addition,
it should only be used when the administrating office has the
resources to effectively administer the contract, and can
devote those resources to the administration. The product or
service must have distinguishing levels of performance or
quality that can be rewarded with award fee if achieved.
Finally, the contract will be most effective if the contract
requires extensive communication between the Government and
the contractor. The FPAF helps focus that communication to
achieve the desires of the Government and rewards the
contractor for his responsiveness.
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2. How do defense contractors and Government officials
view the use of Fixed-Price-Award-Fee as an incentive
arranQement in conducting business?
Almost unanimously, defense contractors were very
positive towards the use of Fixed-Price-Award-Fee. They had
no negative comments towards the contract type other than some
felt it was another control mechanism used by the Government.
The Government had mixed feelings towards the contract with
extremely negative comments coming from those who would have
to administer the contract.
3. How might a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract be
structured to provide for an effective use of award
fee incentives in the Federal acquisition process?
The Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract should be
structured to ensure the award fee is distributed properly for
increased level of effort on the part of the contractor.
These increases in the level of effort should be easily
defined and should be well publicized to the contractor. The
award fee pool should be substantial enough to ensure that the
contractor will be motivated to increase his level of effort
in hopes of receiving an award fee. Finally, a fixed-price-
award-fee contract should only be utilized if a minimum
standard of the product or service can be defined by the
Government in the event the contractor is not motivated by the
award fee.
D. AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
An area for further research in this field involves
determining the administrative cost of utilizing a fixed-
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price-award-fee contract. Determination of this cost could
greatly aid in determining whether this type of contract
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1. What is the purpose, as you perceive it, of the award fee
incentive?
2. Do you think the award fee incentive can be applied to
fixed-price contracts?
3. If the award fee incentive is applied to a fixed-price
contract what are the advantages for the Government/con-
tractor?
4. What are the disadvantages to the Government/contractor?
5. Has your agency used a fixed-price-award-fee contract or
the award fee with other types of fixed price contracts?
Do you know of any agencies that have used this type of
contract?
6. If the award fee incentive is applied to a fixed-price
contract should the contract structure be similar or
different than if used in a cost reimbursement contract?
7. How might an FPAF contract be structured to provide for
an effective use of award fee incentives?
8. What do you think is the best acquisition situation in
which to use an FPAF contract?
9. What is wrong with current contract types that could be
remedied by FPAF? If not FPAF, then what?
10. How should award fee evaluations be structured to
maximize the effectiveness of an FPAF contract?
11. Are Award Fee contracts good at getting what the
Government wants?
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